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Randomness is a fundamental feature in nature and a valuable resource for applications ranging
from cryptography and gambling to numerical simulation of physical and biological systems. Ran-
dom numbers, however, are difficult to characterize mathematically [1], and their generation must
rely on an unpredictable physical process [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Inaccuracies in the theoretical modelling
of such processes or failures of the devices, possibly due to adversarial attacks, limit the reliability
of random number generators in ways that are difficult to control and detect. Here, inspired by
earlier work on nonlocality based [7, 8, 9] and device independent [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] quantum
information processing, we show that the nonlocal correlations of entangled quantum particles can
be used to certify the presence of genuine randomness. It is thereby possible to design of a new
type of cryptographically secure random number generator which does not require any assumption
on the internal working of the devices. This strong form of randomness generation is impossible
classically and possible in quantum systems only if certified by a Bell inequality violation [15]. We
carry out a proof-of-concept demonstration of this proposal in a system of two entangled atoms
separated by approximately 1 meter. The observed Bell inequality violation, featuring near-perfect
detection efficiency, guarantees that 42 new random numbers are generated with 99% confidence.
Our results lay the groundwork for future device-independent quantum information experiments
and for addressing fundamental issues raised by the intrinsic randomness of quantum theory.
∗These authors contributed equally to this work.
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The characterization of true randomness is elusive. There exist statistical tests used to verify
the absence of certain patterns in a stream of numbers [16, 17], but no finite set of tests can ever
be considered complete, as there may be patterns not covered by such tests. For example, certain
pseudo-random number generators are deterministic in nature, yet produce results that satisfy all
the randomness tests [18]. At a more fundamental level, there is no such thing as true randomness
in the classical world: any classical system admits in principle a deterministic description and thus
appears random to us as a consequence of a lack of knowledge about its fundamental description.
Quantum theory is, on the other hand, fundamentally random; yet, in any real experiment the
intrinsic randomness of quantum systems is necessarily mixed-up with an apparent randomness
that results from noise or lack of control of the experiment. It is therefore unclear how to certify
or quantify unequivocally the observed random behaviour even of a quantum process.
These considerations are of direct relevance to applications of randomness, and in particular
cryptographic applications. Imperfections in random number generators [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] (RNG) can
introduce patterns undetected by statistical tests but known to an adversary. Furthermore, if the
device is not trusted but viewed as a black box prepared by an adversary, no existing RNGs can
establish the presence of private randomness. Indeed, one can never exclude that the numbers were
generated in advance by the adversary and copied into a memory located inside the device.
Here, we establish a fundamental link between the violation of Bell inequalities and the un-
predictable character of the outcomes of quantum measurements and show, as originally proposed
by Colbeck [14], that the nonlocal correlations of quantum states can be used to generate certified
private randomness. The violation of a Bell inequality [15] guarantees that the observed outputs
are not predetermined and that they arise from entangled quantum systems that possess intrinsic
randomness. For simplicity, we consider the Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) form of Bell in-
equality [19], but our approach is general and applies to any Bell inequality. We thus consider two
separate systems that can each be measured in two different ways, with a measurement on each
system resulting in one of two values (Figure 1). The binary variables x and y describe the type
of measurement performed on each system, resulting in respective binary measurement outcomes
a and b. We quantify the Bell inequality violation through the CHSH correlation function [19]
I =
∑
x,y
(−1)xy [P (a = b|xy)− P (a 6= b|xy)] , (1)
where P (a = b|xy) is the probability that a = b given settings (x, y) and P (a 6= b|xy) is defined
analogously. Systems that admit a local, hence deterministic [20], description satisfy I ≤ 2. Certain
measurements performed on entangled states, however, can violate this inequality.
In order to estimate the Bell violation, the experiment is repeated n times in succession. The
measurement choices (x, y) for each trial are generated by an identical and independent probability
distribution P (xy). We denote the final output string after the n runs r = (a1, b1; . . . ; an, bn) and
the input string s = (x1, y1; . . . ;xn, yn). An estimator Iˆ of the CHSH expression(1) determined
from the observed data is given by
Iˆ =
1
n
∑
x,y
(−1)xy [N(a = b, xy)−N(a 6= b, xy)] /P (xy) , (2)
where N(a = b, xy) is the number of times that the measurements x, y were performed and that
the outcomes a and b were found equal after n realizations, and where N(a 6= b, xy) is defined
analogously.
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The randomness of the output string r can be quantified by the min-entropy [21] H∞(R|S) =
− log2 [maxr P (r|s)], where P (r|s) is the conditional probability of obtaining the outcomes r when
the measurements s are made. We show (see Appendix A) that the min-entropy of the outputs r
is bounded by
H∞(R|S) ≥ nf(Iˆ − ) (3)
with probability greater than 1 − δ, where  = O(√− log δ/(q2n)) is a statistical parameter and
q = minx,y P (xy) is the probability of the least probable input pair. The function f(I) is obtained
using semidefinite programming [22, 23] and presented in Figure 2. To derive the bound (3), we
make the following assumptions: 1) the two observed systems satisfy the laws of quantum theory;
2) they are separated and non-interacting during each measurement step i; 3) the inputs xi, yi are
generated by random processes that are independent and uncorrelated from the systems and their
value is revealed to the systems only at step i (see Figure 1). Other than these assumptions, no
constraints are imposed on the states, measurements, or the dimension of the Hilbert space. We do
not even assume that the system behaves identically and independently for each trial; for instance,
the devices may have an internal memory (possibly quantum), so that the ith measurement can
depend on the previous i−1 results and measurement settings. Any value of the min-entropy smaller
than (3) is incompatible with quantum theory. The observed CHSH quantity Iˆ thus provides a
bound (see Figure 3) on the randomness produced by the quantum devices, independent of any
apparent randomness that could arise from noise or limited control over the experiment.
This result can be exploited to construct a novel RNG where the violation of a Bell inequality
guarantees that the output is random and private from any adversary, even in a device-independent
scenario [12, 13] where the internal workings of the two quantum devices are unknown or not
trusted (See Appendix B). Some amount of randomness at the inputs is necessary to perform the
statistical tests used to estimate the Bell inequality violation. Hence what we describe here is a
randomness expansion scheme [14] where a small private random seed is expanded into a longer
private random string. The randomness used to choose the inputs needs not be divulged and can
be used subsequently for another task. The final random string, the concatenation of the input and
output random strings, is thus manifestly longer than the initial one. However, when n becomes
sufficiently large, a catalysis effect is possible wherein a seed string of length O(
√
n log
√
n) produces
a much longer random output string of entropy O(n), as illustrated in Figure 3 (see Appendix B).
This is possible because I can be adequately estimated without consuming much randomness by
using the same input pair most of the time [e.g., (x, y) = (0, 0)] while only seldom sampling from
the other possibilities, in which case q  1. This follows from the fact that the CHSH expression
depends only the conditional probabilities P (ab|xy), which can be estimated even if x, y are not
uniformly distributed.
Although the final output string may not be uniformly random (it may not even pass one of
the usual statistical tests [16, 17] of randomness), we are guaranteed that its entropy is bounded
by (3). With the help of a small private random seed, the output string can then be classically
processed using a randomness extractor [24] to convert it into a string of size nf(Iˆ−) that is nearly
uniform and uncorrelated to the information of an adversary. The bound (3) establishes security of
our randomness expansion protocol against an adversary that measures his side-information before
the randomness extraction step, e.g., against an adversary that has only a short-lived or bounded
quantum memory. This is because it applies when conditioned to any measurement performed
by the adversary. However, our protocol is not yet proven to be universally-composable against a
full quantum adversary, that is, secure against an adversary that stores his side-information in a
3
Inputs Rotations
N(0, 0;x, y) N(0, 1;x, y) N(1, 0;x, y) N(1, 1;x, y)
Total
P (a = b|xy)
(x, y) (ϕx, ϕy) events
0,0 0◦, 45◦ 293 94 70 295 752 0.782
0,1 0◦, 135◦ 298 70 74 309 751 0.808
1,0 90◦, 45◦ 283 69 64 291 707 0.812
1,1 90◦, 135◦ 68 340 309 89 806 0.195
Table 1: Observed number of events N(a, b;x, y) for which the measurement on one atom gave
outcome a and the measurement on the other atom gave outcome b, given the binary choices of
the measurement bases (x, y) corresponding to pi/2 qubit rotations with phase angles (ϕx, ϕy) on
the equator of the Bloch sphere. The last column gives the fraction of events where a = b given
each input. If the experiment is interpreted as consisting of identical and independent realisations
(an assumption not made elsewhere in this paper), the data then indicate a CHSH observable
of Iˆ =
∑
x,y(−1)xy[P (a = b|xy) − P (a 6= b|xy)] = 2.414 ± 0.058, significantly beyond the local-
deterministic threshold of I = 2.
quantum memory which can be measured at a later stage. A universally-composable proof would
also cover the situation in which the adversary tries to estimate the random numbers after getting
partial information about them. Proving universally-composable security of our protocol would
also probably lead to much more efficient randomness expansion schemes. Note that the fact that
the bound (3) holds for devices that have an internal memory is a significant advance over the
device-independent protocols [9, 12, 13] proposed so far. It is the crucial feature that makes our
protocol practical.
The experimental realization of this scheme requires the observation of a Bell inequality with
the detection loophole closed (near-perfect detection of every event), so that the outputs r cannot
be deterministically reproduced. The two individual systems should also be sufficiently separated so
that they do not interact, but it is not necessary for the two subsystems to be space-like separated
(see Appendix C).
We realize this situation with two 171Yb+ atomic ion quantum bits (qubits) [25] confined in two
independent vacuum chambers separated by about 1 meter. The qubit levels within each atom are
entangled through a probabilistic process whereby each atom is entangled with emitted photons
and the interference and coincident detection of the two photons heralds successful preparation of
a near-maximal entangled state of the two remote atomic qubits through entanglement swapping
[26], as described in Fig. 1 and Appendix D. The binary values a and b correspond to subsequent
measurement results of each qubit obtained through standard atomic fluorescence techniques (de-
tection error < 3%) [25], and every event is recorded. The respective binary measurement bases x
and y are chosen randomly and set by coherent qubit rotation operations prior to measurement.
Direct interaction between the atoms is negligible and classical microwave and optical fields used
to perform rotations and measurements on one atom have no influence on the other atom (we per-
form statistical tests to verify that the measurement data is compatible with this hypothesis, see
Appendix D.4). To estimate the value of the CHSH inequality we accumulate n = 3, 016 successive
entanglement events over the period of about one month, summarized in Appendix D.1 and Table
I. The observed CHSH violation of Iˆ = 2.414 represents a substantial improvement over previous
results [27, 26]. The probability that a local theory, possibly including an internal memory of past
events [28], could produce such a violation is P (Iˆ ≥ 2.414) ≤ 0.00077 (see Appedendix D.3). In
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the experiment, we chose a uniform random distribution of the initial measurement bases inputs
[P (x, y) = 1/4] to minimize the number of runs required to obtain a meaningful bound on the out-
put entropy (see Figure 3). The observed CHSH violation implies that at least H(R|S) > 42 new
random bits are generated in the experiment with a 99% confidence level. This is the first time that
one can certify that new randomness is produced in an experiment without a detailed model of the
devices. We rely only on a high-level description (atoms confined to independent vacuum chambers
separated by one meter) to ensure the absence of interaction between the two subsystems when
the measurements are performed. Since no active measures are taken in our experiment to control
this interaction, these new random bits cannot be considered private in the strongest adversarial
device-independent scenario. The level of security provided by our experiment will nevertheless be
sufficient for many applications as it guarantees that almost all failure modes of the devices will be
detected. The current experiment does not reach the catalysis regime mentioned above, owing to
the low success probability of heralded entanglement generation (2×10−8) [26]. However, it should
be possible to exceed the catalysis threshold by improving the photon-collection efficiency through
the use of nearby optical collection elements or optical cavities [29].
Stepping back to the more conceptual level, note that Eq. (3) relates the random character of
quantum theory to the violation of Bell inequalities. This bound can be modified for a situation
where we assume only the no-signalling principle instead of the entire quantum formalism (see
Figure 2 and 3 and Appedenix A.3). Such a bound lays the basis for addressing in a statistically
significant way one of the most fundamental questions raised by quantum theory: whether our
world is compatible with determinism (but then necessarily signalling), or inherently random (if
signalling is deemed impossible).
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Figure 1: Experimental realization of private random number generator using two 171Yb+ qubits
trapped in independent vacuum chambers. Each atom emits a single photon (to the left) that is
entangled with its host atomic qubit and coupled into optical fibers; the interference of the photons
on the beamsplitter (BS) and subsequent coincidence detection on photomultiplier tubes (PMT)
herald the entanglement of the atomic qubits [26]. After the qubits are entangled, binary random
inputs (x, y) are fed to microwave (µ-wave) oscillators that coherently rotate each qubit in one
of two ways prior to measurement [26]. Each qubit is finally measured through fluorescence that
is collected on PMTs [25], resulting in the binary outputs (a, b). Abstractly, we can view this
scheme as composed of two black boxes that receive inputs x, y and produce outputs a, b. In our
theoretical analysis, no hypothesis are made about the internal working of the devices, but the
classical and quantum information flowing in and out of the boxes is restricted (dotted lines). In
particular, the two boxes are free to communicate before inputs are introduced (to establish shared
entanglement), but are no longer allowed to interact during the measurement process. Moreover
the values of the inputs are revealed to the boxes only at the beginning of the measurement process.
In the experiment, no active measures are taken to control the flow of information in and out of
the systems. However, once the atoms are entangled, direct interaction between them is negligible.
Moreover the value of the chosen measurement bases (x, y), obtained by combining the outputs
of several random number generators, is unlikely to be correlated to the state of the atoms before
the measurement microwave pulses are applied, satisfying the conditions for the bound (3) on the
entropy of the outputs.
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Figure 2: Plot of the function f(I). The function f(I) can be interpreted as a bound on the
min-entropy per use of the system for a given CHSH expectation I, in the asymptotic limit of
large n where finite statistics effects (the parameter  in (3)) can be neglected. The function f(I)
(curve a) is derived through semidefinite programming using the techniques of [22,23] (semidefinite
programming is a numerical method that is guaranteed to converge to the exact result). Curve
b corresponds to the analytical lower-bound f(I) ≥ − log2
[
1− log2
(
1 +
√
2− I24
)]
. Curve c
corresponds to the minimal value f(I) = − log2 (3/2− I/4) of the min-entropy implied by the
no-signalling principle alone. The function f(I) starts at zero at the local threshold value I = 2.
Systems that violate the CHSH inequality (I > 2), on the other hand, satisfy f(I) > 0, i.e., have a
positive min-entropy.
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Figure 3: Bound nf(I) on the minimum entropy produced vs. the number of trials n for an
observed CHSH violation of Iˆ = 2.414, and a confidence level 1 − δ = 99%. The amount of
randomness given by the bound (3) depends on the probability with which the inputs of each trial
(xi, yi) are chosen through the parameter q = minx,y[P (x, y)], where P (x, y) is the probability
distribution of the inputs. We have plotted the bounds on the entropy implied by quantum theory
for a uniform choice of inputs [P (x, y) = 1/4] (curve a) and for a biased choice of inputs given by
P (00) = 1 − 3q, P (01) = P (10) = P (11) = q, where q = αn−1/2 with α = 11 (curve b). For a
given number n of uses of the devices, the uniform choice of inputs leads to more randomness in
the outputs. On the other hand, biased inputs require less randomness to be generated, and the
net amount of randomness produced given by the difference between the output and input entropy
becomes positive for sufficiently large n. Curve c represents the bound on the entropy implied by
the no-signalling principle alone for a uniform choice of inputs. Note that in all cases, a minimal
number of uses of the devices (a few thousand) is required to guarantee that some randomness has
been produced at the confidence level 1 − δ = 99% The inset shows the net amount of entropy
produced (output entropy minus input entropy) for the biased choice of inputs with the observed
CHSH violation.
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A Theoretical results
In this section, we derive the bound (3) presented in the main text. We follow a two-step approach.
In Section A.1, we quantify the randomness of a pair of quantum systems characterized by a given
Bell expectation I. In Section A.2, we apply these results to the experimental data produced by
Bell-violating devices that are used n times in succession and which, in full generality, may not
behave identically and independently at each trial.
A.1 Quantum randomness versus Bell violation
We establish here a relation between the randomness of the measurement outcomes of a quantum
system and its expected Bell violation. In full generality, we consider a Bell scenario with m
different measurements per system, each measurement having d possible results. The two quantum
subsystems are characterized by the joint probabilities PAB|XY = {P (ab|xy)} to produce outcomes
a, b = 1, . . . , d, when measurements x, y = 1, . . . ,m are made. A Bell expression associated to
this scenario is a linear combination I =
∑
abxy cabxyP (ab|xy) of the probabilities specified by the
m2 × d2 coefficients {cabxy}. Probabilities that admit a local description satisfy I ≤ I0, where I0 is
the local bound of the Bell inequality. The CHSH correlation function (1) is a particular example
of such a Bell expression with m = 2 and d = 2.
We quantify the randomness of the output pairs conditioned on the input pairs by the min-
entropy H∞(AB|XY ) =− log2 maxab P (ab|xy)= minab [− log2 P (ab|xy)]. For given Bell violation
I, our aim is to obtain a lower bound on the min-entropy
H∞(AB|XY ) ≥ f(I) (4)
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satisfied by all quantum realizations of the Bell scenario. Let P ∗(ab|xy) denote the solution to the
following optimization problem:
P ∗(ab|xy) = max P (ab|xy)
subject to
∑
abxy cabxyP (ab|xy) = I
P (ab|xy) = tr (ρMax ⊗M by) (5)
where the optimization is carried over all states ρ and all measurement operators Max and M
b
y , de-
fined over Hilbert spaces of arbitrary dimension. The minimal value of the min-entropy compatible
with the Bell violation I and quantum theory is then given byH∞(AB|XY ) = − log2 maxab P ∗(ab|xy).
To obtain a lower-bound on the min-entropy as a function of the Bell violation I which does
not depend on the input pair (x, y), it is thus sufficient to solve (5) for all output and input pairs
(a, b) and (x, y). This can be done by adapting in a straightforward way the technique introduced
in [1, 2] and generalized in [3].
In [1, 2], an infinite hierarchy of conditions Ci (i = 1, 2, . . .) necessarily satisfied by all probabil-
ities of the form P (ab|xy) = tr (ρMax ⊗M by) are introduced. These conditions can be characterized
by semidefinite programs (SDP) of finite size. Conditions higher in the hierarchy, that is cor-
responding to higher values of i, are more constraining, i.e., they better reflect the constraints
P (ab|xy) = tr (ρMax ⊗M by), but they also correspond to SDP’s of larger size. By replacing in (5)
the conditions P (ab|xy) = tr (ρMax ⊗M by) by the semidefinite constraints Ci for i = 1, 2, . . ., one
obtains a sequence of relaxations R1, R2, . . . of the original problem that can be solved through
semidefinite programming since the constraint
∑
abxy cabxyP (ab|xy) = I and the objective function
in (5) are both linear in the probabilities P (ab|xy). The solutions of these relaxations yield a se-
quence of upper-bounds on the optimum of (5), which in turn yields a sequence of lower bounds on
the min-entropy: f (1)(I) ≤ f (2)(I) ≤ . . . ≤ H∞(AB|XY ). The exact form of these lower bounds
depend on the Bell inequality specified by the coefficients {cabxy}, but they are all convex functions
that are equal to 0 at the classical point I = I0.
Formulating the problem as an SDP is extremely useful, as numerical methods are guaranteed
to find the global optimum of the SDP, i.e., will yield up to numerical precision the exact values
of f (1)(I), f (2)(I), . . ..We have solved the SDPs corresponding to the second relaxation step (i = 2)
for the CHSH inequality using the matlab toolboxes SeDuMi [4] and YALMIP [5] (see Figure 2).
Upper bounds on the min-entropy can be obtained by searching numerically for solutions to
(5) with fixed Hilbert space-dimension. Specifically, one can introduce a parameterization of the
state and measurement operators and vary the parameters to maximize (5). We find that our
upper and lower bounds coincide up to numerical precision (10−9), that is, the relation between
the min-entropy and the CHSH violation presented in Figure 2 is tight.
Using the same method, it is also possible to find a relation between the Bell violation I and
the local min-entropy, defined by H∞(A|X) = − log2 maxa,x P (a|x), where P (a|x) =
∑
b P (ab|xy)
is the marginal probability distribution of Alice’s system. Note that the local min-entropy gives a
lower bound on the global min-entropy, since H∞(AB|XY ) ≥ H∞(A|X).
In the case of the CHSH inequality, we are able to obtain the following tight analytical lower
bound (see Figure 2):
H∞(A|X) ≥ 1− log2
(
1 +
√
2− I
2
4
)
. (6)
To derive the above bound we use the fact that the in the case of the CHSH inequality (two
inputs with binary outcomes), it is sufficient to consider measurements on a two-qubit system [6]
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of the form |Ψθ〉 = cos θ|00〉+ sin θ|11〉. For a given state |Ψθ〉, one can then easily compute both
P ∗θ = maxa,x Pθ(a|x) ≤ cos 2θ, and using the Horodecki criterion [7], the maximal CHSH violation
Iθ ≤ 2
√
1 + sin2 θ. The region that is accessible to quantum theory, is then given by the convex hull
of the above set of points when we let 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi/4. This corresponds to the region characterized
by the inequality P (a|x) ≤ 12
(
1 +
√
2− I2/4
)
, which implies Eq. (6). The above bound is tight
because it is possible to achieve simultaneously P ∗θ = cos 2θ and Iθ = 2
√
1 + sin2 θ with the same
set of measurements on the state |Ψθ〉.
A.2 Randomness produced by Bell devices used n times in succession
To apply the results of the previous section to the experimental data produced by devices that
violate a Bell inequality, one has first to estimate the Bell violation. This requires to use the devices
a large number n of times in succession. In full generality, one cannot assume, however, that the
devices behave identically and independently at each use. For instance, they may have an internal
memory, so that what happens at the ith use of the devices depends on what happened during
the i − 1 previous uses. The results derived in the previous section must therefore be combined
with a statistical approach that takes into account such memory effects. We carry out this analysis
below and show how the randomness produced by the devices can be quantified and determined
experimentally without making any particular assumptions about their internal behaviour.
We thus suppose that we have devices that violate a Bell inequality. The devices are used n times
in succession. We denote by xi, yi ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the measurement inputs and by ai, bi ∈ {1, . . . , d}
the measurements outputs at round i. We denote by ak = (a1, a2, . . . , ak) the string of the first k
outputs ai, and we define similarly b
k, xk, and yk. We suppose that the input pairs (xi, yi) at round
i are independent and identical random variables with distribution P (xi = x, yi = y) = P (x, y).
Note that in general P (x, y) may not be a product distribution P (x, y) = P (x)P (y).
Let PR|S = {P (anbn|xnyn)} be the probability distribution of the final output string r = (an, bn)
given the fact that the sequence of inputs s = (xn, yn) has been inserted in the devices. Similarly
to the single-copy case, the randomness of the output string conditioned on the inputs can be
characterized by the min-entropy H∞(R|S) =− log2 maxr P (r|s)= minanbn (− log2 P (anbn|xnyn)).
We derive here a lower bound on − log2 P (anbn|xnyn) valid for all (anbn) and (xn, yn). This implies
a lower bound on H∞(R|S), as H∞(R|S) ≥ − log2 P (anbn|xnyn). We start with the identities
− log2 P (anbn|xnyn) = − log2
n∏
i=1
P (aibi|ai−1bi−1xiyi)
= − log2
n∏
i=1
P (aibi|xiyiW i) (7)
=
n∑
i=1
− log2 P (aibi|xiyiW i)
The first equality follows from Bayes rule together with the fact that the response of the system at
round i does not depend on future inputs (xj , yj) with j > i. In the second equality, we introduced
the variable W i = (ai−1bi−1xi−1yi−1) to denote all events in the past of round i. The behaviour of
the devices at round i conditioned on the past is characterized by a response function P (aibi|xiyiW i)
and a Bell violation I(W i). Whatever be the precise form of the quantum state and measurements
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implementing this behaviour, they are bound to satisfy the constraint − log2 P (aibi|xiyiW i) ≥
f(I(W i)), as required by (4). Inserting this relation into Eq. (7), we obtain
− log2 P (anbn|xnyn) ≥
n∑
i=1
f
(
I(W i)
)
≥ nf
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W i)
)
(8)
where we used the convexity of the function f to deduce the second inequality. We now show that
the quantity 1n
∑n
i=1 I(W
i) can be estimated with precision using only the information coming from
the input and output strings observed in the experiment.
Let χ(e) be the indicator function for the event e, i.e. χ(e) = 1 if the event e is observed,
χ(e) = 0 otherwise. Consider the random variable
Iˆi =
∑
abxy
cabxy
χ(ai = a, bi = b, xi = x, yi = y)
P (x, y)
, (9)
which is chosen so that its expectation conditioned on the past W i is equal to E(Iˆi|W i) = I(W i).
We define Iˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 Iˆi as our estimator of the Bell violation. In the case of the CHSH inequality,
it is readily verified that (9) correspond to the expression (2) given in the main text. Let q =
minxy{P (x, y)} and let us assume that q > 0 (that is, we assume that each possible pair of inputs
(x, y) has a non-zero probability to be chosen). Let us introduce the random variables Zk =∑k
i=1
(
Ii − I(W i)
)
. It can be verified that (i) E(|Zk|) < ∞, and that (ii) E(Zk|W 1, . . . ,W j) =
E(Zk|W j) = Zj for j ≤ k. Thus the sequence {Zk : k ≥ 1} is a martingale1 [10] with respect to
the sequence {W k : k ≥ 2}.
The range of the martingales increment are bounded by |Ii − I(W i)| ≤ 1q + Iq, where Iq is the
highest possible violation of the inequality I allowed by quantum theory. We can therefore apply
the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality [10, 11, 12, 13] P (Zn ≥ ′) ≤ exp
(
− ′2
2n(1/q+Iq)2
)
, which implies
that (with ′ = n)
P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(W i) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ii − 
)
≤ δ, (10)
where
δ = exp
(
− n
2
2(1/q + Iq)2
)
. (11)
1 A martingale is a stochastic process (i.e., a sequence of random variables) such that the conditional expected
value of an observation at some time k, given all the observations up to some earlier time j, is equal to the observation
at that earlier time j. This causality constraint — expressed formally by condition (ii) above — is very strong, and it
implies that in some respects martingales behave like sums of independent variables. In particular, if the martingale
increments (from time k to the time k+ 1) are bounded, they obey a large deviation theorem, the Azuma-Hoeffding
inequality, which we use to derive Eq. (10). Martingales were introduced in quantum information in the context of
Bell tests in order to show that having an internal memory of past events is only of marginal help to local models [8, 9].
Here we use the theory of martingales in the context of randomness generation to show that the same device can
be used n times in succession without significantly changing the rate of randomness generation with respect to the
mathematically simpler but impractical case where n independent devices are used in parallel.
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Thus the sum of the Bell expressions 1n
∑n
i=1 I(W
i) can be lower than the observed value Iˆ =
1
n
∑n
i=1 Ii up to some  only with some small probability δ. Combining this last result with Eq.
(8), we conclude that
H∞(R|S) ≥ − log2 P (anbn|xnyn) ≥ nf
(
Iˆ − 
)
(12)
with probability at least 1− δ.
A.3 Bounds using no-signalling only
As mentioned in the main text, it is also possible to prove lower bounds on the min-entropy of the
form Eq. (4), but where we impose rather than the full quantum formalism only the no-signalling
conditions. That is, we impose that the measurement outcomes produced by the devices cannot be
used for arbitrary fast communication, even at a hidden level. We are thus led to a new optimisation
problem, which replaces the optimisation problem Eq. (5) we studied previously:
P ∗(ab|xy) = max P (ab|xy)
subject to
∑
abxy cabxyP (ab|xy) = I
P (ab|xy) ≥ 0,∑
ab P (ab|xy) = 1,∑
a P (ab|xy) = P (a|x),∑
b P (ab|xy) = P (b|y),
(13)
where the last two equalities are the no-signalling conditions. Solving (13) (which can be done
using linear programming), one deduces a bound of the form P ∗(ab|xy) ≤ αI + β, where in full
generality α and β may depend on a, b, x, y. This follows from the fact that the constraints in eq.
(13) define a polytope.
In analogy to Eq. (6), one could also consider the maximum of P (a|x) subject to the conditions
enumerated in Eq. (13), which we denote P ∗(a|x). In this case also the maximum is bounded by
a finite set of linear inequalities.
In the case of the CHSH expression, the relevant inequalities are:
P ∗(a|x) = P ∗(ab|xy) ≤ 3
2
− I
4
(14)
This follows easily by recalling that the extremal points of the no-signalling polytope when a, b, x, y ∈
{0, 1} fall into two classes, the deterministic points for which P (ab|xy) ≤ 1 and I = ±2, and the
Popescu-Rohrlich boxes for which P (ab|xy) ≤ 1/2 and I = ±4. This in turn immediately implies
a bound of the form eq. (6):
H∞(AB|XY ) ≥ − log2
(
3
2
− I
4
)
. (15)
Using this bound, one can now apply directly all the results presented in section A.2 to obtain a
bound on the min-entropy when the devices are used n times in succession. The only modification
is that in Eq. (11), the maximal possible violation Iq of the Bell inequality allowed by quantum
theory, must be replaced by the maximal possible violation Ins allowed by no-signalling.
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B Quantum randomness expanders
We now discuss how the results that we have just derived can be used in the context of randomness
expansion. Relations between randomness and Bell inequality violations have been discussed in
different contexts in several works, see for instance [14, 15, 16]. In his PhD thesis [17], Colbeck
proposed to exploit this connection for the task of private randomness generation and formal-
ized this idea concretely. Moreover, he introduced a protocol for randomness expansion based on
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) multipartite pure-state correlations. Following [17], we define
quantum private randomness expansion (QPRE) as a single-party task where a user, Alice, expands
a small random initial seed2 into a larger string which is close to uniformly random, even when
conditioned on the information of a potential quantum adversary. In detail QPRE is realised as
follows:
1. The setting: Alice has a pair of devices, each of which has m inputs and can produce d outputs.
We assume that Alice starts the protocol with an initial private random seed t = (t1, t2)
divided in two strings t1 and t2. At the beginning of the protocol, Alice also chooses a
security parameter δ that bounds the probability with which an adversary can cheat.
2. Use of the devices: Alice uses the string t1 to generate pairs of inputs s = (x1, y1; . . . ;xn, yn).
Every pair is generated independently with a probability distribution P (x, y). Alice then
introduces the inputs (xi, yi) in her devices and obtains the outputs (ai, bi); she repeat this
last step n times for i = 1, . . . , n.
3. Evaluation of the min-entropy: from the final input and output strings s = (x1, y1; . . . ;xn, yn)
and r = (a1, b1; . . . an, bn) Alice computes Iˆ (see (9)), and from the chosen value for the security
parameter δ, Alice computes  (see (11)). From these values Alice then computes the bound
(12) on the min-entropy H∞(R|SE) of the raw output string r.
4. Randomness extraction: Alice uses a randomness extractor3 and the string t2 to convert the
raw string r into a slightly smaller string r¯ of size O(nf(Iˆ − )) which is close to uniform and
uncorrelated to the adversary’s information.
The final random string (t, r¯) of Alice is clearly longer than the initial string t provided that
the bound on the entropy H∞(R|SE) is strictly positive. However, when the number n of uses of
the devices is sufficiently large, it is possible to start from an initial seed of length O(
√
n log2
√
n)
to produce a much longer final string of length O (n). Indeed, if Alice selects one of the d2 possible
input pairs (x, y) with probability 1− (d2 − 1)q and the remaining d2 − 1 ones with probability q,
with q small, the randomness required to generate the inputs is then equal to nO(−q log2 q). Taking
q = O(1/
√
n), the initial random seed t1 must thus be of length O(
√
n log2
√
n). The randomness
of the raw string r, on the other hand, is given by (12) where  is of order O(1). For fixed Bell
2Any device-independent random number generation protocol must necessarily use an initial random seed. Indeed,
if Alice follows a deterministic procedure, then there exists a predetermined set of measurement outcomes that will
pass all the tests performed by Alice, and the adversary can simply provide devices that generate these classical
outputs. Thus the fact that we need an initial random seed is not a weakness of our scheme but a necessity inherent
to the concept of device-independent RNG itself.
3Randomness extractors are classical functions that take as input a small uniform random string t2 and a much
longer string whose min-entropy is lower bounded by H∞, and produce as output a string of length H∞ which is
nearly uniform.
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violation Iˆ, the output entropy is thus linear in n. The raw string r can then be transformed into
the fully secure random string r¯ using a randomness extractor with the help of a small random seed
t2, say of length O(poly log n) [18]. This shows that it is possible to construct device-independent
QPRE producing O (n) random bits from an initial seed of total length O(
√
n log2
√
n).
The security of this protocol only holds for the moment against quantum adversaries that
measure their quantum side-information before the randomness extraction step. That our analysis
holds in this situation follows from the fact that when the adversary performs a measurement on
his system, the outcome that he obtains amounts to the preparation of Alice’s devices in some
particular state. But the bound (12) is independent of the way in which the devices have been
prepared and thus also holds when conditioned on the outcome of the adversary’s measurement.
Our protocol is thus not yet proven to be universally-composable against a full quantum ad-
versary, that is, secure against an adversary that stores his side-information in a quantum memory
which can be measured at a later stage. A universally-composable proof would cover the situation
in which the adversary tries to estimate the random numbers after getting partial information about
them. To obtain a full universally-composable proof of security of our QPRE protocol, a bound
on the entropy of the raw string conditioned on the quantum information of an adversary must be
derived. Such a bound could then be used in a randomness extraction procedure secure against a
fully quantum adversary [19].
Proving universally-composable security of our protocol might also open the possibility of more
elaborated protocols where Bell violating devices are used in a concatenated way: the random
string produced by a first device is used as seed for a second device, whose input is in turn used as
seed for the first and so on. Such more complex solutions could lead to much more efficient QPRE
devices. Related to this efficiency question, we note that the results of [20] and [21] imply that
exponential randomness expansion, i.e., the generation of an output random string of size O(n)
starting from a seed of size O(poly log n), is possible in the situation where the devices have no
classical or quantum memory. Note, however, that the fact that our bound (3) holds for devices
that have an internal memory is the crucial feature that makes our protocol practical. It would be
interesting to show that exponential randomness expansion is also possible in this situation.
Finally, we mention that although we focused here our theoretical analysis on a bipartite protocol
(which is easier to implement in practice), our theoretical approach can also probably be generalized
to compute a bound on the randomness produced by the randomness expansion protocol based on
GHZ multipartite correlations introduced in [17].
C Requirements on the devices
In this section, we discuss the requirements that are necessary to generate random numbers certified
by a Bell inequality violation and clarify the concept of device-independence. We also discuss these
requirements in the context of the security of the QPRE task and in the context of our experimental
demonstration.
We recall that the QPRE system is composed of two devices, referred to in the follows as device
A and device B. The derivation of the min-entropy bound (3) rests on the following assumptions.
1. Quantum-theory: The two devices behave according to quantum theory.
That is when an input x (y) is introduced in a device, an output a (b) is produced according
to some quantum process.
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2. Input randomness: The inputs xi, yi at round i are generated by random processes that are
independent and uncorrelated from the devices and their values is revealed to the devices only
at round i.
This guarantees that the behaviour of the devices at round i does not depend on the values
of the inputs used in later rounds, i.e., that the following condition is satisfied
P (aibi|xiyi . . . xnynW i) = P (aibi|xiyiW i) , (16)
where W i denotes, as in Section A.2, all events in the past of round i. This condition is used
in the first line of Eq. (7).
3. Locality: From the moment that the inputs are introduced until the outputs are produced, the
two devices are separated and no signal (quantum or classical) can travel from one device to
the other. Moreover, the input x is introduced only in device A and the input y only in device
B.
This assumption ensures that the Hilbert space describing the two devices factorizes as a
tensor product and that the measurement operators act on each factor in a way that depends
only on the corresponding local input. That is, that the probabilities characterizing a single-
run of the experiment are of the form
P (ab|xy) = tr
(
ρMax ⊗M by
)
. (17)
This mathematical condition is used in the optimization problem (5) in Section A.1.
When the above three conditions are satisfied, the min-entropy bound (3) derived in Section A
follows without additional assumptions on the quantum states, the measurements, the dimension
of the Hilbert space, or any other aspects concerning the internal working of the quantum devices.
This is what we refer to as device-independence — the fact that the min-entropy bound or the
security proof does not depend on a model of the devices.
The conditions listed above represent minimal requirements to apply the device-independence
proof in practice: if one of them is not satisfied then it is no longer possible to guarantee the
presence of randomness through the violation of a Bell inequality 4. Whether these conditions are
verified in an implementation is therefore an important question. However, it is not a question
that has a unique and well-defined answer. Depending on the application, the adversarial scenario
under consideration, and our level of “trust” in the devices, there may be different ways to enforce
these conditions or verify that they are satisfied. As an illustration, we discuss below three possible
ways to ensure that condition 3 is satisfied: i) by imposing space-like separation between the
measurement devices; ii) by shielding the devices; iii) by proper design of the setup.
i) Strict space-like separation. Condition 3 states that the devices should be separated and non-
interacting during the measurement process. Obviously strict space-like separation between the
devices could be used to enforce this separability condition. This space-like separation is required
4Note that although these three conditions are necessary and that we cannot go completely without them, they
can probably be weakened at the expense of the randomness generation rate. This is clear for the first assumption,
as we have seen in Section A.3 that the validity of quantum theory can be replaced by the no-signalling principle.
But it might also be possible to weaken the two other assumptions and show that Bell-violating devices can generate
randomness even if they have a limited amount of prior information about the future inputs or if they can exchange
some limited communication.
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to close the locality loophole in standard Bell tests, where the objective is to disprove alternative
theoretical models of Nature that can overcome the laws of physics as they are currently known.
Here, however, we assume from the beginning the validity of quantum theory and we use Bell
inequalities not as a test of hidden variable models but as a tool to quantify the randomness of
quantum theory. Once we assume quantum theory, they are many ways to ensure that the two
systems are not interacting other than placing them in space-like intervals, e.g. by shielding the
devices as discussed below in point ii).
The view that there is no satisfying way to prevent information from being exchanged between
two systems except by strict space-like separation is very conservative. The main problem with this
level of paranoia is that it makes cryptography impossible. Indeed, a basic assumption behind all
cryptography (classical or quantum) is that users must be confident that information cannot leak
out of their location, devices, computers, etc. If the only constraints on the flow of information are
those which follows from special relativity, cryptography becomes impossible: any secret bit or key
inevitably leaks out to the adversary at the speed of light as soon as produced.
The space-like separation approach may be relevant for non-cryptographic applications of ran-
dom numbers, where privacy is not an issue, such as Monte Carlo algorithms. Its main advantage
is that the condition (17) follows immediately. A secondary point to take into account in this ap-
proach, however, is that the inputs x and y must be generated locally and immediately before being
introduced into the devices, so that they are prevented from knowing the other device’s input5.
Note that space-like separation is essential to test more fundamental implications of our results,
such as the compatibility between determinism and no-signalling mentioned at the end of the paper.
ii) Shielding of the devices. Here, condition 3 is enforced by separating and shielding the devices
and the relevant part of the laboratory. This view is consistent with the known forces in physics
which are either extremely weak (gravity), short range (weak and strong force), or can be screened
by conductors (electro-magnetic force). Note that the shields must have doors with allow the boxes
to interact with the external world (dotted lines in Figure 1). The doors must allow both classical
and quantum information through, to let the devices establish shared entanglement, receive the
inputs x, y, and produce the outputs a, b.
The assumption that laboratories and devices can be adequately shielded against unwanted
leakage of information is implicit in all of cryptography. From the basic cryptographic requirement
that the two devices can be adequately shielded so that they do not send information to the
adversary, it is only a small extra step to require that they can also be adequately shielded so that
they cannot signal to each other. It would be very artificial to assume that the devices are not able
to communicate to the adversary, an essential requirement for any cryptographic application, but
can communicate between each other.
The main disadvantage of this approach is that we are making a technological assumption. One
can never completely rule out that the shielding is sufficient. Particular attention would have to
be paid to this point if it is an adversary that has provided the devices.
iii) Proper design of the experiment. We may have a good confidence that condition 3 is
5This implies that the inputs must be generated with a product probability distribution P (x, y) = P (x)P (y). In
particular, the joint input distribution cannot be of the form P (00) = 1 − 3q, P (01) = P (10) = P (11) = q which
leads to the quadratic catalysis effect discussed in the previous Section and illustrated in Figure 3. A weaker catalysis
effect is nonetheless possible if each individual input is chosen with probabilities P (0) = 1− q, P (1) = q, resulting in
the joint probability P (00) = (1− q)2, P (01) = P (10) = q(1− q), P (11) = q2. Taking q2 = O(n1/4), we find that  in
Eq. (12) is of order O(1), and thus that the output randomness is of order O(n). The randomness consumed at the
inputs, on the other hand, is nO(−q log2 q) = O(n3/4 log2 n1/4).
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satisfied simply based on a proper design and superficial description of the devices. For instance in
the experiment reported here we are using two atoms that are confined in two independent vacuum
chambers separated by about 1 meter. At this distance, direct interaction between the atoms is
negligible and classical microwave and optical fields used to perform measurements on one atom
have no influence on the other atom. Based on this superficial description of the setup, we can
safely assume that we are dealing with two independent quantum systems and that the general
formalism used to derive our bound applies6.
Obviously, this approach is insecure in the adversarial scenario where the devices are untrusted
and assumed to be prepared by an adversary, in which case it is necessary to take active measures
to control the flow of information in and out of the devices, as in point ii) above. The application
of the concept of device-independence, however, is not restricted to this strong adversarial scenario
with untrusted devices. It may be perfectly legitimate to assume that the devices have been built
in good faith and that they do not contain any sneaky component sending unwanted signals (we
must anyway trust the classical computers, devices, etc., used to analyze the data). The problem,
however, is that it is very difficult, even for honest parties, to construct reliable random number
generators. The theoretical modeling of the physical process at the origin of the randomness
source is often incomplete and relies on assumptions which may be very difficult to confirm. This
makes an accurate estimation of the entropy produced by the devices difficult. Most RNGs break
silently, often producing decreasingly random numbers as they degrade. Failure modes in such
devices are plentiful and are complicated, slow, and hard to detect. Imperfections can introduce
patterns undetected by statistical tests but known to an adversary. The generation of randomness
in a device-independent way (that is without detailed modeling of the devices) solves all these
shortcomings of traditional random number generators: the violation of a Bell inequality provides
a bound on the randomness produced by the devices, independently of any noise, imperfections,
lack of knowledge, or limited control of the apparatuses.
Considerations similar to the above ones can be made for the second condition in our list of
assumptions, i.e., the requirement that the inputs should be chosen in a way that appears “random”
to the devices. In our experiment, the value of the chosen measurement bases (xi, yi), obtained by
combining the outputs of several (public) random number generators, is unlikely to be correlated
to the state of the atoms before the measurement microwave pulses are applied, and we can safely
assume that Eq. (16) is satisfied. Of course in a strong adversarial scenario where the devices are
untrusted, the adversary could exploit a prior knowledge of the inputs in the design of the devices.
In this case, it is thus important to generate the inputs with a private random source.
Finally, it is tacit, but obvious, that the implementation should conform to the theoretical
description detailed in Section B. For instance, in the case of the CHSH inequality, we consider
devices that produce binary outcomes a, b ∈ {0, 1} and use all the raw data produced over the n runs
of the experiment in our analysis. In photonic Bell tests, detectors have low efficiencies, and device
often produce a no-event outcome ⊥ corresponding to the absence of a click, i.e., a, b ∈ {0, 1,⊥}.
This leads to the famous detection loophole which is circumvented by applying a post-selection to
the observed data. This represents a departure from our description and our results can therefore
6At first sight a better way to implement our proposal experimentally would be to use two ions in the same trap,
as in [22], as data rates orders of magnitude higher can be achieved. But in this case we cannot assume that the two
ions are separate and non interacting without modeling the details of the experiment. Indeed the ions are at all times
strongly coupled through the vibrational modes of the cavity, and furthermore the measurements cannot be assumed
to act on each ion separately as they are separated by a few microns, comparable to the wavelength of light used for
readout.
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no longer be applied in this case. In our experiment, this problem is not an issue, as every event is
recorded.
More generally, it is straightforward that a Bell violation without closing the detection loophole
(or other loopholes arising from post selection, such as the coincidence time loophole [23]) cannot
be used to certify randomness generation. In a scenario where the devices are trusted, one could
address this requirement by means of the fair sampling assumption, which states that the detected
events represent a fair sample of all the events (including the undetected ones). However, making
the fair sampling assumption requires a detailed knowledge of the devices, and could fail without
one being aware of it (see also attacks based on the detection loophole in traditional QKD [24, 25].).
D Experiment
D.1 Experimental system
Individual 171Yb+ atomic ions are stored in two rf Paul traps located in two independent vacuum
chambers separated by about 1 meter and placed in the magnetic field of 3.4 G that defines the
quantization axis. We encode qubits in the F = 1, mF = 0 and F = 0, mF = 0 hyperfine levels
of the S1/2 ground state of each atom, denoted by |1〉 and |0〉, respectively. Each experimental
sequence begins with a 1 µs optical pumping pulse and 10 µs microwave pulse that prepares each
atom in the |0〉+|1〉 state. Next, a fast laser pulse linearly polarized along the direction of magnetic
field excites both ions to the P1/2 state with a probability close to unity. If the atoms each return
to the ground state by emission of a pi-polarized photon, the frequency of the emitted photons
are entangled with the atomic qubit states. With a small probability, both photons are collected
from each atom and interfered on a 50:50 beamsplitter, with polarizing filters selecting only pi-
polarized light. Detection of coincident photons behind the beamsplitter heralds the preparation of
the entangled state of the two atoms: |0〉| 1〉−eiχ| 1〉 | 0〉 [26, 27]. The experiment is repeated at 95
kHz, but due to finite collection and detection efficiency of the photons, we observe on average only
1 entanglement event every 8 minutes. Given a successful entanglement event, we finally detect each
qubit in measurement bases determined by the input variables x and y [28]. Before measurement,
microwave pulses with a controlled phase and duration resonant with the |0〉 → |1〉 transition rotate
each atomic qubit through a polar angle of pi/2 on the Bloch sphere. The phase difference ϕx−ϕy
between the rotations on the two atoms is adjusted with respect to the phase χ of the entangled
state so that the qubits are appropriately rotated for a Bell inequality violation [29]. Finally, each
atom is illuminated with laser light resonant with the S1/2 F = 1 → P1/2 F = 0 transition, and
the |1〉 state fluoresces strongly while the |0〉 state is nearly dark, resulting in a detection of each
qubit state with 98.5% accuracy [28].
D.2 Generation of measurement settings
The measurement settings were chosen by combining several online random number generators that
use: radioactive decay as a source of randomness [30]; atmospheric noise as a source of random-
ness [31]; and randomness derived from remote computer and network activity [32]. We requested
128 bytes (corresponding to 32 integer numbers) from each of these generators and combined them
using XOR function. This procedure should produce measurement settings that are independent
and uniform. Indeed the measurement settings were tested to ascertain that they did not contain
any obvious bias (see Appendix D.4).
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Before every entanglement event the two least significant bits of one of the above integer numbers
was transmitted to the FPGA board that controls our experimental time sequence. After a two
photon coincidence event the board applies microwave pulses to both ions with a phase that depends
on the measurement setting it obtains from the computer, counts the number of photons during
ions state detection, transmits the state detection results and the measurement settings it used
back to the computer, and receives new measurement settings for the next entanglement event.
When the number of available random numbers in the buffer approaches 0, a new block of random
numbers is requested from the random number generators and added to the buffer.
D.3 Comparison with local causality
The usual interpretation of the experimental violation of a Bell inequality is that the observed
correlations cannot be reproduced by a local model [33]. This should be properly expressed as a
statistical statement. Here we follow the approach of [8, 9] (see also Section A.2) to derive the
relevant statement.
We consider the quantity Ii defined in Eq. (9), and focus on the CHSH inequality with uniform
choice of settings (P (xy) = 1/4). We denote by the superscript l the predictions of local theories.
Let us consider the predictions of local theories. In this case we have −2 ≤ E(I li
(
W i
)
=
I l
(
W i
)
) ≤ 2. The random variables Zk = ∑ki=1 (Iˆi − I l (W i)) are a martingale with respect to the
sequence {W k : k ≥ 2}. The range of the martingales increments are bounded by
∣∣∣Iˆi − I l (W i)∣∣∣ ≤
4 + 2 = 6, where the 4 comes from the possible range of Iˆi and the 2 comes from the range of
I l
(
W i
)
. Applying the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality then implies that the probability that a local
deterministic theory will yield a violation greater or equal than the observed violation Iˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 Ii
is bounded by:
P (
1
n
n∑
i=1
I l(W i) ≥ Iˆ) ≤ exp
−n
(
Iˆ − 2
)2
72
 . (18)
This inequality holds for all local models (even if they can exploit an internal memory that remem-
bers past measurement settings and past outputs) which attempt to violate the CHSH inequality
(with the measurement settings uniformly distributed). Inserting the data from our experiment
(Table 1) shows that the probability that the measurement results could have been produced by a
local model is less than 0.000767.
D.4 Statistical tests
As a check of consistency and of the quality of our experiment, we verified that the bit strings
(x1, y1; . . . ;xn, yn) used as measurement settings and the bit strings a1, b1; . . . ; an, bn produced as
outputs did not reveal any obvious non-random pattern using a standard battery of statistical
tests [34, 35, 36]. However, those batteries were originally designed for sequences containing mil-
lions of bits. As the strings we consider contain several thousands of bits, only the tests statistically
relevant for such small strings were performed. Specifically the tests called “Frequency”, “Block
frequency”, “Runs”, “DFT”, “Serial” and “Approximate Entropy” were reprogrammed from [35]
(sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 2.11, 2.12 ) and the tests called “Two-bit” and “Poker” were repro-
grammed from [36] (section 5.4.4.).
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Statistical test xnyn an bn (a1, b1, ..., an, bn)
Frequency 0.9795 0.7988 0.0743 0.1493
Block Frequency 0.2668 0.5540 0.0592 0.1360
Runs 0.6616 0.2904 0.4312 0.0000
DFT 0.8542 0.3096 0.8686 0.3081
Serial 0.1681 0.1300 0.0119 0.0000
Approximate Entropy 0.2445 0.5568 0.0130 0.0000
Two Bit 0.9024 0.5699 0.1579 0.0000
Poker 0.0189 0.1933 0.0353 0.0000
Table 2: Results of the statistical tests given by the p-values evaluated on the measurement settings,
the outputs of one atom and the other taken separately, and the outputs of the two atoms taken
together.
The result of these statistical tests are described by a p-value, which is the probability that a
perfect random number generator would have produced a sequence less random than the sequence
that was tested, given the kind of non-randomness assessed by the test. A p-value of 1 therefore
means that the sequence tested appears to have been generated by a perfectly random process,
while a p-value of 0 implies that the sequence appear to be completely non-random [35]. Together
with computing the p-value, a significance level α should be chosen for the tests. If the p-value ≥
α, then the hypothesis that the sequence appears to be random is accepted. If the p-value < α,
then this hypothesis is rejected, i.e., the sequence appears to be non-random. Typical values for α
are in the range [0.0001, 0.01] and we choose α =0.001. An α of 0.001 indicates that one would
expect one sequence in 1000 sequences to be rejected by the test if the sequence was generated by
a perfect random number generator. For a p-value ≥ 0.001, a sequence would be considered to be
random with a confidence of 99.9%. For a p-value < 0.001, a sequence would be considered to be
non-random with a confidence of 99.9% [35].
The results of these statistical tests (given by the p-value) evaluated on our data are given in
Table 2. As in Section A.2, we use the notation xn = (x1, ..., xn), a
n = (a1, ..., an) for the settings
and outputs for the first ion; and yn = (y1, ..., yn), b
n = (b1, ..., bn) for the settings and outputs for
the second ion. Each of these strings contains n = 3016 bits and the combination (a1, b1, ..., an, bn)
contains therefore 6032 bits.
As we see from the data in Table 2, the input string xnyn passes all the tests since the p-values
are larger than the chosen significance level α =0.001. This is expected as the random number
generators we used have already been extensively tested. The outputs strings an and bn taken
separately also pass all the tests. This confirms that the experiment performed well and did not
have any important internal bias. Finally, as expected, if all the outputs are grouped into the
combination (a1, b1, ..., an, bn), then the results do not pass the tests because the measurement
outputs on the two atoms are correlated and thus are not independent random variables.
Note that the general theory described in this paper guarantee that the measurement outputs
contain at the 99% confidence level 42 new random bits, independently of any hypothesis on how
the experiment was realised. This is a much stronger statement than passing or not passing the
statistical tests mentioned above, which merely indicate that no obvious non-random patterns are
present in the measurement outputs.
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To verify that the atoms did not influence each other during the measurement in an obvious way,
we also performed statistical tests to check that the data reported in Table 1 in the main text are
compatible with the no-signalling conditions given in Eq. (13). There are 4 no-signalling conditions
to check. In each case we performed a two-sided Fisher’s test. We found p-values of 0.7610; 0.7933;
0.7933; 0.2867 which show that the data are compatible with the no-signalling hypothesis.
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